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Businesses and consumers need to have a robust Application Programming 
Interface (API) management and security program in place to ensure they are using 
the most updated policies to certify that these transactions are adequately secure. 
Technology vendors do provide API Management tools for Customers, and there 
are established API security standards for securing API transactions. Given the 
effort to keep APIs open and easy to implement for Business to Business (B2B) and 
Business to Consumer (B2C) communications, security standards must be part of 
API management. 
This research gathered data to investigate why APIs are vulnerable. The research 
explored the different perspectives among Customers with regards to their own 
professional experiences with developing private APIs for their organizations and 
compared it to the Cyber Security Vendor/Supplier segment that offer products and 
services to assist their Customers with API development, security, and 
management. The research found that API exploits are usually not detected while 
they are occurring and perspectives about security readiness are different by IT 
role. Some basic blocking and tackling fundamentals that can help any organization 
improve API security management are identified by this research. 
 
Keywords: application programming interface; api; security; software as a service; 




The growth of publicly available Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) have 
been growing exponentially since they were first chronicled in 2005  
(Santos, 2017). This new and flourishing domain of Information Technology (IT) 
is referred to as the "API Economy". The popularity of API web services and the 
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additional facility they provide have primarily influenced how enterprise business 
is conducted (Rajaram, et. al., 2013). As the Cloud Operating System evolves, APIs 
must be better defined (Chen, et. al., 2017). As the Internet of Things evolves from 
a concept to literally controlling consumer vehicles and kitchen appliances, APIs 
are at the heart of these communications (Siriwardena, 2014). Cisco estimates that 
by the year 2023, there will be 29 billion devices connected via IP networks, 
primarily communicating via APIs. Furthermore, the diverse nature of mobile 
applications communicating with Web applications via APIs can cause input 
validation inconsistencies, thus leading to serious security issues (Mendoza, Gu, 
2018). 
 
A community organization called The ProgrammableWeb is the world’s leading 
source of information regarding publicly available APIs. With the largest API 
directory on the Web, The ProgrammableWeb’s Research Center has documented 
and categorized over 22,000 public APIs to date. These API providers come from 
companies such as Google, Salesforce, eBay and Amazon. The ProgrammableWeb 
has tracked API growth since 2005, starting with a count of 105. They have notated 
the growth from a curiosity to a trend, to where APIs are providing core service 
functionality for many businesses. The value that APIs have contributed to 
countless organizations is undeniable. They have shown a starting count of 105 in 
2005 with a slight slope to a count of 2000 in January 2010. The numbers 
immediately spike to 12,000 in 2014 and surge past 17,000 in 2017 (Santos, 2017). 
The count as of June 2019 is 22,000 (Berlind, et. al., 2019). Since, private/managed 
APIs cannot be adequately measured (Niinioja, Moilanen, 2018), the surge in the 
use of public APIs is a signal that APIs, whether they be public or private, are the 
backbone of systems communications with a strong growth trend. In this research, 
we gather data to investigate why APIs are vulnerable based on the security 
community perspectives of Cyber Security Customers and Vendors/Suppliers. 
 
With the adoption of virtualization products, many organizations have established 
server farms in their own data centers on-premises, or Private Clouds. As the 
services provided by Public Cloud Providers have matured, more Cyber Security 
Customers have also adopted services in this space, and sometimes from multiple 
Cloud Providers. The term “Hybrid Cloud Environment” has recently emerged, 
where organizations have both private and various public cloud services in their IT 
portfolio (Edwards, et. al., 2017). The interaction between the components of the 
Hybrid cloud, specifically Private Cloud and Public Cloud services, further 
complicates the transference of data via API communications. Furthermore, as 
more companies move their IT services out of internal data centers to Public Cloud 
Providers, the potential requirements for essential institutional data to be accessible 
from multiple entities and across Private Clouds and Public Clouds become more 
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prevalent. If that institutional data resides at a Public Cloud Provider Software as a 
Service (SaaS) offering as an example, there is a need to establish secure API 
communications between third parties. Since these connections are server-to-
server, or service-to-service and very soon serverless-to-serverless (McGrath, 
Brenner, 2017), the cyber-security challenges increase with every new service 
offering.  
 
As such, the development of APIs (both private/managed and publicly 
accessible/open source) to conform to the software architectural design standard 
called Representational State Transfer (REST) is needed. RESTful APIs have 
particular functions. The GET function can retrieve data, the PUT function can 
modify existing data, the POST function can create new data, and DELETE can 
remove data from the data source. The RESTful API (Representational State 
Transfer) standard encompasses a lot of power within the GET, PUT, POST, and 
DELETE functions. Also, entities that provide APIs as part of their service make a 
conscious effort to keep APIs open and relaxed for Business to Business (B2B) and 
Business to Consumer (B2C) communications (Monahan, 2017). As a result, 
security standards should be strongly considered and implemented correctly.  
There lies the paradox of the Application Programming Interface (API); the essence 
of the API is to further communications between B2B and B2C by making 
integrations open and accessible, and security runs directly counter to that effort. 
B2B and B2C efforts to keep their APIs open to provide value to their  
Cyber Security Customers frequently open them too wide, leaving them vulnerable 
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Source: Survey Results: The Future of API (Application Programming Interface) 
Security: The Adoption of APIs for Digital Communications and the Implications 
for Cyber Security Vulnerabilities 
 
PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) is an online community 
that has become prominent in the field of Web application security. OWASP 
produces related articles, methodologies, documentation, and tools. OWASP 
provides these services free to software developers (Wichers, Williams, 2018). 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) creates a Top Ten Most 
Critical Web Application Security Risks report that was most recently updated in 
March 2018. The data was collected from over 100,000 applications and APIs. 
Even though all ten noted vulnerabilities relate to APIs indirectly, there were two 
that are directly related to APIs. Specifically, 
 
#1; (A3:2017) – Sensitive Data Exposure 
 
“Many web applications and APIs do not properly protect sensitive data, 
such as financial, healthcare, and Personally Identifiable Information 
(PII). Attackers may steal or modify such weakly protected data to conduct 
credit card fraud, identity theft, or other crimes. Sensitive data may be 
compromised without extra protection, such as encryption at rest or in 
transit, and requires special precautions when exchanged with the 
browser.” 
 
#2: (A9:2017) – Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities 
 
“Components, such as libraries, frameworks, and other software modules, 
run with the same privileges as the application. If a vulnerable component 
is exploited, such an attack can facilitate serious data loss or server 
takeover. Applications and APIs using components with known 
vulnerabilities may undermine application defenses and enable various 
attacks and impacts.” 
 
In this research, we gather data to investigate why APIs are vulnerable based on the 
security community perspectives (Cyber Security Customer and 
Vendors/Suppliers). Furthermore, we investigate if there is a difference in attitudes 
in terms of the API threats and vulnerabilities between Cyber Security 
Vendors/Suppliers and Cyber Security Customers.  
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Inherent vulnerabilities could be part of the design of API architectural standards 
that are in place today, or it could be more related to how organizations implement 
APIs within their environments. With the proliferation of APIs in the IT industry 
today, organizations need to understand if recent API security incidents could have 
been prevented with new protection standards in authentication, authorization, and 
encryption.  
 
“It is very easy to create a bad API and rather difficult to create a good one. Even 
minor and quite innocent design flaws have a tendency to get magnified out of all 
proportion because APIs are provided once but are called many times.” 
(Henning, 2009). 
 
As such the research questions to be addressed in this study are as follows, 
 
The primary research question is: 
 
Is the security community including Cyber Security Customers, and 
Vendors/Suppliers of the opinion that security standards currently in place are 
robust enough to remediate new security threats in public and private/managed 
API domains and cross-vendor API communications? 
 
The second research question is: 
 
Does the security community including Cyber Security Customers, and 
Vendors/Suppliers of the opinion that there is a need to develop new and 
improved security standards in public and private/managed API domains and to 
secure cross-vendor API communications? 
 
The third research question is: 
 
Is there is a difference in attitudes in terms of the API threats and vulnerabilities 
between Cyber Security Vendors/Suppliers and Cyber Security Customers? 
 
The fourth research question was directed to Cyber Security Customers only: 
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Qualitative Research, Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Qualitative methods of research differ from quantitative methods in their means of 
inquiry. Qualitative methods seek to describe a phenomenon in a rich and holistic 
manner and to understand how people interpret their experiences (Creswell, 2009; 
Merriam, 2009). Whereas, quantitative methods are more suited to reducing data to 
measurable variables that can be generalized to larger populations or statistically 
measuring cause and effect. One method of obtaining qualitative data is through the 
use of semi-structured interviews. The semi-structured interview approach is an 
open-ended format in which questions are used as a guide with two intentions, 1) 
the ability for the researcher to adequately obtain data related to the study’s research 
question and 2) an opportunity for the participants to sufficiently depict their lived 
experiences (Kvale, Brinkmann, 2009). Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) noted that 
semi-structured interviews allow for the participant to relate data in a spontaneous 
and rich manner where the participant engages in a back and forth conversation 
allowing for not merely the answering of questions, but the telling of one’s story. 
As such, six one-on-one in-depth interviews were conducted with various 
respondents that qualified as Cyber Security Customers and Vendors/Suppliers in 
terms of their role in the IT industry. The unstructured questions were mapped to 
the research questions and examined the following areas: 
 
In your opinion, do you think that security standards currently in place are robust 
enough to remediate new security threats in public and private/managed API 
domains and cross-vendor API communications? 
 
In your opinion do you feel there is a need to develop new and improved security 
standards in public and private/managed API domains and to secure cross-vendor 
API communications? 
 
For Cyber Security Customers only: Are you planning to use Microservices or 
Serverless Compute?  
 
The respondents for the in-depth interviews included both Cyber Security 
Customers and Vendors/Suppliers. They were selected through an availability 
sample through the authors’ networks. The respondent’s demographics are detailed 
in the following Table 1. 
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Table 1. In-depth Interview Respondent Role 
 
Title Industry Role 
Chief Information Security 
Officer 
Healthcare Customer: leads and implements 
progressive IT security practices 
within Healthcare. 
Account Executive Cyber 
Security 
Cyber Security Vendor/Supplier 
Director, Cloud Enablement Insurance Customer: software development 
leader with cloud and security 
expertise. 
Chief Technology Officer Cyber 
Security 
Cyber Security Vendor/Supplier 
Director of IT Security,  Higher 
Education 
Customer: CISSP, CISM, C 
CISO, Security Plus 
Systems Team Leader Higher 
Education 
Customer: Applications Leader, 
Database and Integrations 
Source: Survey Results: The Future of API (Application Programming Interface) 
Security: The Adoption of APIs for Digital Communications and the Implications 
for Cyber Security Vulnerabilities 
 
The qualitative insights garnered from the in-depth interviews informed the 
development of the survey tool for the descriptive research design used to capture 
the data to address the research questions quantitatively. 
 
Descriptive Research Design 
 
A descriptive research design in the form of an online survey was conducted among 
50 qualified respondents. A descriptive study intends to look for variations in 
characteristics within a sample for a given population (Siedlecki, Sandra, 2020). 
 
The respondents were qualified with screening criteria for survey participants to be 
information systems business professionals with experience using Cyber Security 
products and services in their role as a Customer or Vendor/Supplier. An 
availability sample was used for the survey data collection. As such, respondents 
were recruited from the authors’ networks to participate in the survey through an 
availability sample using various communications via social media, along with 
telephone recruiting. The online survey system used was Qualtrics XM. 
 
This screening criteria of the population produced a sample of three respondent 
profiles; 
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• Cyber Security Vendors/Suppliers; 47%, 
• Cyber Security Customers; 47%, 
• Others; Instructors, DevOps, and indirect security responsibilities; 6%.  




Source: Survey Results: The Future of API (Application Programming Interface) 
Security: The Adoption of APIs for Digital Communications and the Implications 
for Cyber Security Vulnerabilities 
 
Questions were directed to Cyber Security Customers and Cyber Security 
Vendors/Suppliers mapped to the study’s research questions.  
 
Cyber Security Vendors/Suppliers were asked: 
 
• Do you believe the security products you provide today can address cross-
vendor API communications? 
• Do you have new products or services that will be ready for multi-vendor 
microservices and serverless communications? 
 
Cyber Security Customers were asked: 
 
-What are the threats/challenges you face with API security? How are you securing 
the cross-vendor API transaction? 
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Both Cyber Security Customers and Vendors/suppliers were asked: 
 
-In your opinion, are the API security standards in place robust enough to remediate 
security threats in the current environment? 
 
The data was then analyzed using a frequency analysis. The differences between 
groups (Cyber Security Customers and Vendors/Suppliers) were explored using a 
multivariate technique using cross-tabulations and the Chi-Square hypothesis test 




Regarding the current API Standards, the analysis of the survey results found that 
over two thirds of all respondents felt that that the existing security standards for 
APIs are not robust enough to remediate the current security threats facing API 
implementations. as illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Are the current API security standards robust enough to remediate 




Source: Survey Results: The Future of API (Application Programming Interface) 
Security: The Adoption of APIs for Digital Communications and the Implications 
for Cyber Security Vulnerabilities 
 
This finding leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Ho There is no difference in perspective as to whether the current security standards 
for APIs are robust enough to handle the current threats facing API 
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HA There is a difference in perspective as to whether the current security standards 
for APIs are robust enough to handle the current threats facing API 
implementations, Cyber Security Customers versus Vendors/Suppliers. 
 
A Chi-Square Test was performed to confirm statistical significance comparing the 
results by IT security role. The test found evidence that there is a difference in 
attitude by IT security role. Specifically, all Cyber Security Customers surveyed; 
(security professionals that use security products to protect the data of their entities 
and clients) responded "no" that the current API security standards are not robust 
enough to remediate current security threats. Over two thirds of Vendors/Suppliers; 
(IT executives in companies that produce security software and security services) 
responded "yes" that the current API security standards are robust enough to 
remediate current security threats. This indicates that Cyber Security 
Vendors/Suppliers are more optimistic than Customers. The hypothesis test 
generated a P-value of .003, which led to the rejection of the null hypothesis with a 
99.7% level of confidence. As such, this finding provides evidence that there is a 
difference in attitude perspectives by the IT security role. The percentage split can 
be seen in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: “Are the current API security standards are robust enough to remediate 
current security threats?” 
 




Yes     0.0 % 67.0 % 
No 100.0 % 33.0 % 
   
Source: Survey Results: The Future of API (Application Programming Interface) 
Security: The Adoption of APIs for Digital Communications and the Implications 
for Cyber Security Vulnerabilities 
 
Pearson Chi-Square Value = 9.000 
P value = .003 
 
Respondents who answered “yes” when asked if the API standards in place today 
are sufficient were asked to elaborate on their response. All of the respondents 
who answered “yes” (that the current API security standards are not robust 
enough to remediate current security threats) were Cyber Security 
Vendors/Suppliers. The general theme that emerged from the Vendor/Supplier 
responses was that the focus should be on the security design of the application so 
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the API can inherit and leverage those features. An illustrative comment among 
the Vendor/Supplier segment demonstrates this theme: 
 
“An API is only the interaction with the application. The focus should be 
on developing the application properly. If we took the proper time to 
develop software with a security focus from step one, we wouldn't need to 
strengthen API. OWASP wouldn't exist.” 
 
Respondents who answered “no”, (who were all Customers and 33% of the 
Vendors/Suppliers) when asked if the API standards in place today are sufficient 
elaborated on their response. The general theme that emerged from the Customer 
responses was that the current API security standards are not robust enough to 
remediate current security threats. An illustrative comment among the Customer 
segment demonstrates this theme: 
 
“API based attacks exploit API design flaws that are specific to each API 
and are therefore unique in nature. Other attacks involve brute force attacks on 
the login or the theft of tokens or credentials which give access to the API service 
and data as a normal user.” 
 
In addition, those who identified themselves as Cyber Security Vendors/Suppliers 
were asked, "As a Cyber Security Vendor/Supplier, is your company planning to 
release any new products or services in your roadmap to address new API security 
vulnerabilities?" Over two thirds of the Cyber Security Vendors/Suppliers felt that 
new security products and services would address API vulnerabilities. Cyber 
Security Vendors/Suppliers; (specifically companies that produce security software 
and security services) responded "yes" at 67%. However, the rest of the 
Vendors/Suppliers responded "no" at 33%. The percentage split can be seen in 
Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Are the upcoming Security Vendors/Suppliers Product and Service 
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Source: Survey Results: The Future of API (Application Programming Interface) 
Security: The Adoption of APIs for Digital Communications and the Implications 
for Cyber Security Vulnerabilities 
 
Furthermore, those who identified themselves as Cyber Security Customers were 
asked, “Are you planning to use Microservices or Serverless Compute?”. 
Approximately two thirds of the respondents were planning to implement new 
compute services, such as microservices and Serverless computing. Cyber 
Security Customers; (specifically security professionals that use security products 
to protect the data of their entities and clients) responded “yes” at 65% and the 
rest of the Cyber Security Customers responded “no” at 35%. The percentage split 
can be seen in Figure 5. 
 




Source: Survey Results: The Future of API (Application Programming Interface) 
Security: The Adoption of APIs for Digital Communications and the Implications 
for Cyber Security Vulnerabilities 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The primary issue with API vulnerabilities occurs when the security design of the 
underlying application is insufficient. API security only goes as far as it is designed. 
There are many real-world examples of "Works as Designed" (WAD), where the 
poor implementations for API security design left companies exposed to data 
breaches. These vulnerabilities were not the result of hacking, per se, since the 
hackers did not have to penetrate firewalls or decipher complicated encryption 
algorithms. The poor implementation of API security left the door wide open for 
anyone to walk in and harvest the data that they should not have had access to in 
the first place. Therefore, the expression that has recently developed, the "leaky 
API" is named appropriately (Spring, 2018). 
 
The Future of Application Programming Interface  Munsch - Munsch 
   
©International Information Management Association, Inc. 2020  37         ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy 
. 
Most recently revised, it is now estimated that over 87 million Facebook Cyber 
Security Customers had their private information exposed by an API that was 
originally installed for a mobile application (Romano, 2018). The Facebook user 
data that was harvested by Cambridge Analytica (CA), a data analytics firm that 
worked with political election campaigns, found the “leaky API” and extracted the 
supposedly private data from 87 million user accounts.  
 
Between 2013 and 2015, Cambridge Analytica harvested profile data from 
Facebook users without permission and used that data to populate their own 
marketing database based on each user’s individual likes and interests. They then 
created a personality profile for each user so they can be targeted for specific 
political campaigns more effectively. The Federal Trade Commission fined 
Facebook 5 billion dollars for mishandling data (Feiner, Rodriguez, 2019), and 
Cambridge Analytica ceased operations and filed for bankruptcy (Confessore, 
Rosenberg, 2018). 
 
Cambridge Analytica was able to procure this data in the first place thanks to a 
loophole in Facebook’s private API that allowed third-party developers to collect 
data not only from users of their apps but from all of the people in those users’ 
friends network on Facebook. This access came with the stipulation that such data 
could not be marketed or sold; a rule CA promptly violated (Romano, 2018). 
 
Reports calling CA’s data harvesting a “hack,” or a serious violation of Facebook 
policy are all incorrect.  
This is because the information collected by the company was information that 
Facebook had freely allowed and originally intended only mobile developers to 
access. Technically, anyone who used third-party  
Facebook apps also could have found out that they were allowing those apps to see 
data from their friends’ profiles. As a Facebook spokesperson reiterated to the New 
York Times, “No systems were infiltrated, and no passwords or sensitive pieces of 
information were stolen or hacked.” (Rosenberg, et al., 2018). 
 
To this effect, the API-level Security Certification of Android Applications 
(ASCAA) organization found that out of 200 tested API applications, 12.5% failed 
their sample rules (Pei, et al., 2017). The ASCAA found evidence that the failed 
applications were either over-privileged or did not declare permissions at all. 
 
Another example of the "Works as Designed" paradigm as it pertains to API 
security was the T-Mobile breach (Spring, 2018). In August of 2018, T-Mobile left 
an insecure, unprotected API on their website, thus exposing the personal data of 
2.3 million Cyber Security Customers.  
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By directly manipulating the end of the URL (Uniform Resource Locator) string 
with a different phone number in the web browser, a hacker was able to test for 
actual customer phone numbers, and the web site responded with personal 
information. An example of the URL manipulation that was used is in Figure 6 
below. 
 





The API returned the following confidential customer data for 123-456-7890; 
 
• Email address 
• Name 
• Billing Account Number 
• International Mobile Subscriber Identity Number (IMSI) 
• Other phone numbers under the account (e.g., friends and family). 
 
Another example demonstrated by Netflix employees revealed that certain API-
based communications extended the attack surfaces for their microservices. In front 
of an audience of dozens of coworkers at the 2017 DefCon Security Conference, a 
Netflix security engineer ran a test on their streaming system.  
He was able to bring the site down. Instead of admonishment, there was a sense of 
accomplishment since he, along with a Netflix cloud security engineer, successfully 
proved that the flagship streaming site was vulnerable to an unconventional 
type of Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attack.  
Recognizing this new vulnerability triggered efforts from Netflix to protect the 
service from this new threat, along with the rest of the Internet. The premise was 
that a few simple requests could generate many backend requests, similar to a 
poorly written structured query language (SQL) script on a database. A query like 
this scans the entire list of tables inefficiently, thus filling up all of the database 
connections for any other traffic. Since the inbound client activity occurred below 
the rate limits on the API gateway, the critical protective measure for API traffic in 
the architecture let the bad request through (Newman, 2017). Rate limits, where the 
API gateway can set a fixed number of times an API can be evoked, can be an 
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effective way of securing an API. In this use-case, however, the requests occurred 
at a pace that evaded the rate limit setting. 
After reviewing the survey responses and segmenting by Cyber Security Customers 
versus Vendors/Suppliers, there is a significant difference between 
Vendors/Suppliers and Cyber Security Customers of security products and services 
in terms of readiness to address current security threats. Vendors/Suppliers should 
more closely monitor Cyber Security Customers' perspectives so that indications in 
the area are infused with the “voice of the customer.” Specifically, Cyber Security 
Customers sense that the current API security standards are not robust enough to 
mitigate current security threats while they are overwhelmingly considering new 
technologies such as Microservices or Serverless Compute. 
API security is different from Web application security. API Authentication (e.g., 
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Web Token (JWT) and Oauth2) is a stateless 
transaction (Stannard, 2015). Websites that host the APIs do not track session data, 
so it is easy for a hacker to keep trying different combinations of URL string 
variations to exploit an unprotected, insecure API vulnerability. Web applications 
generally use stateful transactions that track session data by creating a session 
cookie (a tracking key that is valid only one time for that individual session) is a 
more secure transaction. The session cookie ensures that the transaction is a single 
conversation between one specific customer and the website. Session cookies 
typically cannot be reused, so a new one is created when the customer authenticates 
on the next visit. Traditional web security protects against structured query 
language (SQL) injection and cross-site scripting. API security requires more 
protections since hackers can go straight to the data via a stateless transaction, by 
nature of the service that APIs intend to provide. 
API security is more complex since it happens at layer 7 of the Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) model (Mitchell, 2019). Layer 7 is the application layer, so 
the detection of malicious use via API gateways is only just starting to mature. An 
event where a hacker is retrieving data that is unprotected sometimes occurs below 
the rate limits of an API gateway (Netflix example) since it is not as evident as an 
Advanced Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS), which occurs at layer 4 of the 
OSI model; the transport layer. A DDOS attack will usually flood the gateway, and 
thus the web site behind it with so many connections it will affect service. A well-
configured Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) can usually protect the web site by 
detecting the suspect source IP addresses and then preserve the service by dropping 
the specific TCP/IP packets only from those suspect source IPs. The issue is that 
IPS systems operate at layer four and not at layer 7, where the API traffic occurs. 
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As such, the importance of API security in the current IT environment cannot be 
understated. Everything is a digital asset now (Harguindeguy, 2017). As an 
example, banks are now primarily an online presence, where most daily 
transactions are performed via smartphone. Photos reside on Facebook, Instagram, 
and iCloud accounts. Other elements that demonstrate the importance of API 
security are as follows; 
 
• As reported by The ProgrammableWeb (Santos, 2017), Public API growth is 
exponential. 
• Hackers always find the path of least resistance. An unprotected API service is 
an easy target (Wheeler, 2018). 
• Respondents in this study indicated plans to implement new compute services, 
such as Microservices and Serverless compute. The industry is moving to the 
Internet of Things (IoT), Microservices, and Serverless Compute services (e.g., 
Amazon Web Services (AWS) Lambda), which extends the possible attack 
surfaces to hackers. 
• According to the Global Equinix Interconnection Index (Equinix, 2019), by 
2021, Interconnection bandwidth is projected to be ten times the volume of the 
present-day Internet. 
• API exploits are usually not detected while they are occurring. Organizations 
need a robust security information and event management (SIEM) process to 
detect API exposure in order to remediate properly (Harguindeguy, 2017). 
 
Security needs the proper nurturing to perform optimally for any organization. 
Some basic blocking and tackling fundamentals that can help any organization 
improve API security management are listed below, as indicated by the 
literature and this research. 
 
1) Start with an API inventory, then gain visibility of your API traffic with 
leveraging a Security Information and Event Management system (SIEM) for 
logging (Harguindeguy, 2017). 
i) Know about the APIs that are up and running in your organization. 
Some APIs are installed via default when organizations install new 
software.  
ii) Do not register your internal API names in public DNS. Keep internal 
information internal. 
iii) If your organization utilizes an API Gateway, make sure that you are 
properly logging all events. 
2) Always design with security in mind. If security is not a part of your design 
process right from the very beginning, your security strategy will perform as an 
afterthought, as it was designed. Most organizations consider security at the 
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time of integration or deployment, which is too late in the development process 
(Siriwardena, 2014). 
3) Use API Management methodology. Beyond just providing the business 
functionality, send your APIs through the creation, publication, deprecation, 
and retirement cycles. Proper documentation is essential (Siriwardena, 2014). 
4) If your organization is ready to adopt Agile operations, do not just implement 
better Development and Operations (DevOps) processes, but go the extra mile 
and implement Development, Security and Operations (DevSecOps) processes 
(George, 2018). Some DevSecOps examples are: 
i) Continuous Integration/Continuous Delivery (CICD), 
ii) Code repository/code review – Antivirus scan and automate code 
deployment with rollback. 
iii) Continuous Configuration Automation (CCA).  
iv) If you find any process that is repeatable and scriptable, automate. 
5) Don’t use basic authentication, use standard authentication (Salem, 
Mazalevskis, 2017) e.g.: 
i) JWT (JSON Web Token) 
ii) Oauth2 
iii) Username /password is not enough. 
iv) Use end-user authentication rather than API keys or Client ID/Client 
secret when possible. 
6) Limit access requests (throttling) and use Hypertext Transport Protocol Secure 
(HTTPS) server-side and HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) headers with 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) (Salem, Mazalevskis, 2017). 
7) When it comes to input, use the proper HTTP methods for GET, POST, PUT 
and DELETE and validate the content (Salem, Mazalevskis, 2017). 
8) For output, send X-Content and X-Frame options and don’t return sensitive data 
(Salem, Mazalevskis, 2017). 
9) Concerning processing (Salem, Mazalevskis, 2017): 
i) for endpoint protection, avoid user-owned resource IDs and auto-
incremented IDs, use Universally Unique Identifiers (UUID), 
ii) use End-To-End TLS (version 1.3). 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study utilized a descriptive research design in the form of the Qualtrics XM 
Online survey tool. It was conducted among qualified respondents to obtain better 
clarity on security issues related to APIs. The data captured and the statistical 
analysis generated helped determine how respondents as security community Cyber 
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Security Customers and Vendors/Suppliers have different views on API 
vulnerabilities. 
The sample size yielded a statistically significant result in exploring the hypothesis 
test of differences between Cyber Security Customers and Vendors/Suppliers. 
Future research would also attempt to gain insights from a broader audience for a 
more global perspective. Furthermore, future research can take on a qualitative 
aspect with additional one-on-one in-depth interviews (IDIs) to further explore the 
insights surfaced in this research utilizing comprehensive probing techniques to 
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